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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintrattb* and Alan N. Resnick**

CROSS·COLLATEAALIZATION
OF PREPETITION
INDEBTEDNESS AS AN
INDUCEMENT FOR
POSTPETITION FINANCING:
A EUPHEMISM COMES OF AGE
The springboard for a successful
reorganization of an insolvent business is most often the debtor's ability
to obtain new financing simultaneously with the commencement of
the chapter 11 case. The Bankruptcy
Code, as was the former Bankruptcy
Act, is designed to assist the debtor
in obtaining postpetition financing
when necessary to accomplish reorganization,
Although the debtor in possession
may obtain, without court approval,
unsecured credit in the ordinary
course of business resulting in an
administrative expense priority for
the creclitor, such credit rarely is
enough to revive tqe troubled debtor.l Thus, Section 364 of the Bank• C9unset to the law firm of Levin
& Weintraub, New York City; mem-

ruptcy Code authorizes the court,
after notice and a hearing, to permit
the procurement of unsecured credit
other than in the or<;iinary course of
business. 2 If needed as an induce·
ment for new financing, the court
may order that the potential lender
have "superpriority" over all other
administrative~ expenses and/ or be
secured by a lien on property of the
estate.3 If an existing lienor is ad·
equately protected, the court may
even authorize the granting of senior
lienor stat1,1s to the postpetition
lender when alternative means of
financing are unavailable. 4
The Texlon Saga

The case of In re Texlon Corpo·
ration5 illustrates the need for such
postpetition financing and tests the
limits of the court's discretion in
approvin~ financing arrangements.
Preparatory to embarking upon a
Chapter XI case under the former
Bankruptcy Act, Texlon sought financing from its factor, Manufac·
turers Hanover Commercial Corpo·

ber of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
• • Associate Dean and Professor of
Law, Hofstra University School of Law,
Hempstead, New York.
They are also co-authors of Bankruptcy Law Manual, published by War·
ren, Gorham & Lamont.
1 11 U.S.C. § 364(a). For a dis.
cussion of the risks involved in extending credit in the ordinary course
of business, see Weintraub & Resnick,
Bankruptcy Law Manual
(1980).

2

11

u.s.c.

§

364(b).

a 11 U.S.C. § 364(c). See former
Bankruptcy t\ct § 344 which autho·
rized the issuance of certificates of in·
debtedness to obtain fresh financing in
· ·
'
Chapter XI cases.
4 11 U.S.C. § 364(d). See former
Bllnkruptcy Act § 116(2), which per·
mitted certificates of indebtedness with
priority over secured as well as unsecured claims in Chapter X cases.

V 8.11[5]

5

86

596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ration (Manufacturers). If we read
between the lines, Manufacturers
was not anxious to factor Texlon's
receivables in the Chapter XI case
for fear of sustaining additional
losses if the debtor in possession
was adjudicated a bankrupt. In such
an event, it might have been extremely difficult to collect the receivables
from the account debtor who in turn
might have looked upon this bankruptcy as an opportunity to resist
payment by setting up all sorts of
defenses against payment.
To minimize its risk, Manufacturers proposed a financing agreement to take effect upon the filing
of the Chapter XI case whereby
Manufacturers would factor the account receivables of the debtor in
possession on a nonrecourse basis
with a discretionary right on its part
to advance up to $100,000 to be collateralized by certificates of indebtedness.6 As security for this financ·
ing, Texlon would grant Manufacturers a security interest in all its
inventory and equipment, as well as
an equity in the accounts receivable,
"not merely for amounts paid under
the factoring agreement and for the
certificates of indebtedness, but also
for preexisting debt" 7 held by Manufacturers which amounted to almost
$700,000. Because the security interest in the debtor's assets secures
prepetition, as well as postpetition,
indebtedness, this financing arrangement is known as "cross-collateralization."
Bankruptcy Court Authorizes
Cross-Collateralization

1974, the debtor in possession submitted an order and application for
authorization to approve the agreement, representing that "any delay
in authorizing these arrangements
would be prejudicial to Texlon's
continued viability, that only immediate approval would enable it to
continue in business, and that the
need for the relief was urgent and
could not await a creditors' committee meeting." 8 Based on these representations, the bankruptcy judge
granted the application ex parte and,
on November 6, Manufacturers
commenced financing the debtor in
possession.
On that same day, copies of the
order were served upon the ' attorneys for an informal creditors' committee which had been organized
prior to the commencement of the
case. On November 19, an unofficial
committee was elected and counsel
for Texlon informed the creditors'
committee of the fillancing order.
This committee subsequently became
the official creditors' committee.
During all this time Texlon Wl;lS
suffering heavy losses and, on January 10, 1975, was adjudicated a
bankrupt.9 By that time, Manufacturers had made postpetition factoring advances of $567,000 and a
loan of $100,000. After a liquidation of the assets, there was sufficient
moneys to repay Manufacturers its
postpetition advances to the debtor
in possession and to leave a surplus
of $267,000 which represented the
chief asset in the estate. Manufacturers contended that this surplus
should be applied to its prepetition

Upon the filing of the petition
under Chapter XI on November 1,

s I d. at 1095.
9 See former Bankruptcy Act § 376
(2), which provided for the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt re·
suiting in liquidation.

o See former Bankruptcy Act § 344.
7 In re Texlon Corp., note 5 supra,
at 1094 (emphasis added).
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indebtedness of between $660,000
and $695,000.
Trustee Challenges
Bankruptcy Court
On January 16, 1975, the trustee
(formerly the secretary to the creditors' committee) moved, through
its attorneys (form~rly the attorneys
for the creditors' committee), to
modify the bankruptcy ;udge's order to the extent that any equity in
the collateral after satisfaction of
the inde:btedness to Manufacturers
for its Chapter XI advances shoul<;t
be applied for the benefit of all creditors pro rata. The bankruptcy judge
held that reliance on this or~er by
Manufacturers had resulted in vested
rights which were ample to deny
such modification. However, he did
comment that the financing order
was " 'interdicted by the {Bankruptcy] Act' and similar orders
should not be eqtered in the future"
because they have the effect of violating the priority provision:; of the
Bankruptcy Act as well as preferring
certain prepetition unsecured creditors over others.lo The district
court agreed that the ..cross-collateralization" provision should not
have been included in the financing.
However, it reversed the bankruptcy
court decision, denying the trustee's
motion by holding that no supervening equities atta~hed in favor of
Manufacturers since reliance was
upon a "facially void order" 11-nd
Manufacturers lost nothing because
10 In

payment had been made for all its
postpetition advances.ll
On appeal, Manufacturers argued
that nothing in the Bankruptcy Act
forbids "cross-collateralization" and
that the district court erred by failing to recognize that the financing
order had become final and nonappealable prior to the trustee's application.
Court of Appeals Objects to
Ex Parte Order of Bankruptcy Court
The court of appeals, in affirming
the district court decision, considered, among other things, the history
of the <issuance of certificates of indebtedness and preferential treatment of ~reditors and setoffs. The
most interesting features of its opin,
ion, insofar as practice under the,
present Bankruptcy Code is concerned, were the discussions as to
the cross-collateralization of prepetition indebtedness and the adequacy of notice and opportunity to
be heard sufficient to sustain such a
financing order.
Evidently, the terminology "crosscollateralization" w~ new in bankruptcy judicial jargon, although colloquially ancient, for the court of
appeals stated:
[The appeal] concerns a practice,
euphemistically called "cross-collateralization." . . . What this
term means is that in return for
making new loans to a debtor in
possession under Chapter XI, a
financing institution obtains a security interest on all assets of the
debtor, both those existing at the

re Texlon Corp., note 5 supra,

The bankruptcy judge held
that the cross-collateralization order
violated Sectiqns 64a(l) and 70(d) (5)
of the former Bankruptcy Act, The
court of appeals rejected the bankruptcy judge's analysis of these actions.
ld. at 1095-1097.
at 1095.

llJd. at 1095. Compare 11 U.S.C.
364(e), which protects the goodfaith lender against reversal of the financing order unless the order is
§

stayed pending appeal,
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date of the order and those created in the course of the Chapter
XI proceeding, not only for the
new loans, the propriety of which
is not contested, but for existing
indebtedness to it. [Emphasis
added.] 12
The issues, therefore, were whether
the bankruptcy court properly authorized the cross-collateralization in
the financing order and whether the
trustee's challenge to the order was
too late to permit its reversal. The
court of appeals answered both questions in the negative.
In an effort to bolster its position beyond the authority of the
former Bankruptcy Act, Manufacturers turned to the Bankruptcy
Code, which at that time had not yet
become law. In response, the court
of appeals stated: "[We] see nothing in § 364(c) or in the other provisions of that section that advances
the case in favor of 'cross-collateralization.' " 18 However, the court was
quick to add that it would not go so
far as to hold that "under no conceivable circumstances could 'crosscollateralization' be authorized." 14
The court's fundamental objection
was:
[A] financing scheme so contrary
to the spirit of the Bankruptcy
Act should not have been granted
by an ex parte order, where the
bankruptcy court relies solely on
representations by a debtor in
possession that credit essential to
the maintenance of operations is
not otherwise obtainable. The
debtor in possession is hardly
neutral. 15
12 In re Texlon Corp.,
at 1094.
13 I d. at 1098.

not~

The nub of the entire controversy
seemed to have revolved around
the necessity of a hearing as a basis
for granting relief. Such hearing, the
court indicated, "might determine
that other sources of financing are
available; that other creditors would
like to share in the financing if similarly favorable terms are accorded
them; or that the creditors do not
want the business continued at the
price of preferring a particular lender." 16 Moreover, in turning to Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the court observed that all orders
authorizing a debtor in possession
to obtain credit except in the ordinary course of business could be
made only after notice and a hearing.
In a recent artic!e, 17 Bankruptcy
Judge Ordin, far from condemning
cross-collateralization, cites instances
where courts authorize the payment
of the prepetition debts in order to
preserve the potential for rehabilitation (i.e., wages to key employees,
hospital insurance premiums, certain
debts of suppliers, and the like) .
Judge Ordin emphasizes the necessity of providing for a speedy hearing at which the circumstances described by the court of appeals in
Texlon can be considered before the
general meeting of creditors, sugIG I d. at 1098-1099. For cases dealing with the notice requirement for financing orders under the former Bankruptcy Act, see In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952);
In re Prima Co., 88 F.2d 785 (7th Clr.
1937); In re Public Leasing Corp.,
344 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Okla 1972).
See also Tondel & Scott, "Trustee Certificates in Reorganization Proceedings
Under the Bankruptcy Act," 27 Bus.
Law. 21 (1971).
17 Ordin, Case Comment, 54 Am.
Bkcy. L.J. 173 (1980).

5 supra,

H[d.
15[d.
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gesting a shorter notice to all or
most major creditors. "(T]o the extent that procedures can be devised
to achieve creditor protection with·
out the needless sacrifice of the
debtor's potential for rehabilitation,
the Bankruptcy Court should adopt
its procedural techniques to accommodate these conflicting interests." 18
In this connection, it is worth·
while to consider the provisions of
Section 102(1) (B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes dispensing with an actual hearing if
"there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such
act must be done, and the court authorizes such act." Authorization of
the act without an actual hearing is
proper only if notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances
has been given. For example, a tele·
phone call to the attorneys for ma•
jor creditors or an unofficial creditors' committee advising them that
the order was being presented to the
court at a convenient hour of the
day may be appropriate in cases of
extreme urgency. In addition, the
actual hearing may not be avoided if
a timely request for such a hearing
is made by a party in interest. In
view of the significant eftect which
cross-collateralization has on prepetition creditors, courts should not
permit any shortcuts which deprive
creditors of an opportunity to be
heard prior to the financing order.
Lessons to Be Learned

Is cross-collateralization an evil?
Clearly, it has the effect of giving
the lender a preference with respect
to iis unsecured prepetition claim.
As pointed out in Texlon, Section
364 of the Code does not expressly
lBfd.

provide for it. On the other hand,
the Code does not expressly prohibit
cross-collateralization either. There
is no indication in the legislative history or elsewhere that Section 364
was intended to be the exclusive list
of permissible postpetition financing
arrangements, or that the powers of
the bankruptcy court under the for·
mer Act have been narrowed in this
context,lll The court ·of appeals in
Texlon did not close the door on the
use of cross-collateralization under
conceivable circumstances and rejected the bankruptcy court's conclusion that such a financing order was
"interdicted by the [former Bankruptcy] Act and similar orders shol.)ld
not be entered in the future." 2o
There is no doubt, however, that
cross-collateralization may be utilized as a last resort only when the
debtor is otherwise unable to obtain needed financing on acceptable
terms. The list of permissible fi·
nancing arrangements set forth in
Section 364 must prove to be in·
adequate in the particular circumstances before the approval of crosscollateralization. An illustration of
,such utilization can be found in the
recent case of In re Allbrand Appliance & Television Co., lnc,21 An
application for cross-collateralization
was made upon notice to the creditors' committee and other interested
parties. At the hearing, testimony
was introduced of the necessity for
financing the operations of the debtor
in possession, its urgency, the inability to obtain credit from other finance
1o See Comment, "Initial Financing
Restrictions in Chapter XI Bankruptcy
Proceedings," 78 Columbia L. Rev.

1683, 1698 (1978).
2o In re Texlon Corp., note 5 supra,
at 1095.
21 Dkt. No. 80-B-17736-41 (S.D.N.Y.

at 180.

1980).
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It is a means of facilitating new fi-

companies, and the competitive nature of the agreement in view of the
charges to be made by other companies where no cross-collateralization
was at stake. The court granted the
application.
We conclude that cross-collateralization is more than a euphemism.

nancing for a debtor in possession
which may be authorized after a
hearing on notice results in the conclusion that no other methods on
acceptable terms of financing are
available to save the reorganizing
debtor from forced liquidation.

TRIVIA GALORE
"In 1894, there were only four automobiles in the United
States.
"In 1913, the tax on a four-thousand-dollar annual income
was one penny.
"There are more than twenty thousand !<nown ways of earning a living.
"Chinese typewriters are so complex that even a skilled operator cannot type at a rate of more than three or four words per
minute.
"The second safest place to work in the entire industrial
world is in an ammunition plant.
"Henry Ford, of automobile fame, originally planned to
manufacture cheap watches on a large scale as a means of
livelihood.
"John Wanamaker was the first merchant in the United
States to insert full-page advertisements in a newspaper."
-"Salted Peanuts"
by E.C. McKenzie
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